Facts
Daniel Cook was working as an independent contractor installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom of a home under active construction by SMG Construction Services, LLC in Gwinnett County. The bathroom was located just one to two steps from an open foyer area with an exposed balcony ledge that lacked a guardrail. Cook had passed through this area multiple times that morning and testified that he knew the ledge was open and could see where it dropped off.
While attempting to straighten an air hose, Cook shuffled backward toward the exposed ledge and fell to the first floor, suffering serious injuries. Cook later testified that drywall dust, overspray, lighting conditions, and blended wall and floor colors created an optical illusion that made the edge appear farther away than it was.
Cook filed a premises liability action against SMG, alleging that SMG failed to maintain a safe premises. SMG moved for summary judgment, asserting affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and voluntary negligence, arguing that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.
The trial court granted summary judgment in SMG’s favor, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the unguarded ledge and that his knowledge was at least equal to SMG’s. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, evidence suggesting that conditions affected his perception of its precise location created jury questions as to whether Cook had equal knowledge and exercised ordinary care.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari.
Issue & Holding
The issues in this case was: Did Cook’s admitted awareness of the unguarded balcony establish actual knowledge of the specific hazard as a matter of law, such that SMG was entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and voluntary negligence?
Yes, as to the actual knowledge element only. The Supreme Court held that Cook had actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—from which he fell. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, concluding that it improperly conflated actual and constructive knowledge, and remanded for further consideration of SMG’s remaining affirmative defenses.
Reasoning
Actual Knowledge Versus Constructive Knowledge
The Court began by reiterating core premises liability principles under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Premises liability depends on the landowner’s superior knowledge of a hazard. Where a plaintiff has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the injury, the landowner generally owes no duty to warn.
Actual knowledge exists when a plaintiff personally observes or is aware of the hazard. Constructive knowledge, by contrast, concerns what a person should have known through the exercise of ordinary care.
Here, Cook testified that he knew the balcony was open, lacked a guardrail, and that he could see where it dropped off. This testimony established actual knowledge as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals erred by relying on cases addressing constructive knowledge—where plaintiffs claimed they never saw the hazard—and applying them to a case involving undisputed actual knowledge.
Knowledge of the “Specific Hazard”
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reframing of the hazard as the precise proximity of the edge to Cook’s work area. Cook himself conceded that the hazard was the unguarded balcony, and his injuries resulted from falling off that ledge.
A plaintiff’s misunderstanding of precise details of a known hazard does not negate actual knowledge. The Court analogized to prior cases involving alligators, skylights, and bodies of water, explaining that once a plaintiff knows of a dangerous condition, the law does not require knowledge of every underlying detail for actual knowledge to exist.
Here, Cook’s awareness of the exposed ledge satisfied the requirement that he knew the specific hazard that caused his injuries.
Optical Illusions and Environmental Conditions
Cook argued that dust, lighting, and color blending created an optical illusion that impaired his perception of the ledge’s location. The Court explained that such evidence may be relevant to constructive knowledge—whether someone should have discovered a hazard—but cannot negate undisputed actual knowledge. And again, it was the unguarded ledge that allowed him to fall, and he had actual knowledge of that hazard.
Because SMG proceeded on a theory of actual knowledge, and Cook admitted awareness of the unguarded ledge, evidence about visibility conditions did not create a genuine issue of material fact on that point.
Effect on Affirmative Defenses
Although the Court concluded that SMG established Cook’s actual knowledge, it did not decide whether SMG was entitled to summary judgment outright. Actual knowledge is only one element of SMG’s affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and voluntary negligence.
The Court vacated and remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider whether SMG had also satisfied the remaining elements of those defenses, including whether Cook voluntarily exposed himself to the danger and failed to exercise ordinary care.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice McMillan wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Peterson and Ellington. The dissent concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had knowledge of the specific hazard.
The “specific hazard” analysis was key, because the dissent reasoned that knowledge of the general hazardous condition—the unguarded ledge—was not the relevant inquiry. The dissent stated that the specific hazardous condition was the “proximity of the balcony’s edge to the area on the second floor where he was working.” And there were genuine issues of fact as to actual knowledge of that specific hazard.
The dissent reiterated established Georgia precedent, including the 2017 Georgia Supreme Court case of Johnson Street Properties, LLC v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51 (2017), that establishes that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard that caused the injury is determinative. In other words, knowledge of generally prevailing hazardous conditions that are observed and avoided is not controlling.
In this case, the dissent pointed to evidence showing that Cook testified that a variety of conditions obscured his vision of the balcony’s edge that day, including drywall dust, the overspray, lighting conditions, and the colors of the surrounding environment. Therefore, it concluded a jury could find that Cook lacked actual knowledge of the specific hazard.
Conclusion
The importance of SMG Construction Services v. Cook is likely to be overstated by defendants in future cases. The case does not represent a sea change in Georgia premises liability law. Instead, the majority opinion simply applies established precedent in evaluating the facts before the Court.
The decision does not change Georgia law holding that knowledge of a specific hazardous condition is required to establish equal knowledge of assumption of the risk defenses. The majority and dissent simply disagreed about what constituted the specific hazard. The majority said it was the unguarded ledge; the dissent said it was the proximity of the balcony’s edge to the area on the second floor.
The importance of Cook to future cases will be about how courts analyze whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a generally hazardous condition or a specific hazard within the plaintiff’s actual knowledge. Future summary judgment battles will likely focus on that key issue. On the one hand, defendants will try to make the specific hazard as general as possible, while plaintiffs will argue that the hazard was something more specific.
Citation: SMG Construction Services, LLC v. Cook, 922 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2025)
