Facts
On June 7, 2021, Keyana Lipsey was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Rylie Mayfield. While stopped in a line of cars waiting to exit a park, unknown assailants in another vehicle fired gunshots at Mayfield’s car, striking Lipsey in the foot. The shooters were never identified, and there was no evidence suggesting that Lipsey or anyone in the vehicle was specifically targeted.
Lipsey filed a negligence lawsuit against a John Doe defendant and sought uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits under Mayfield’s Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co. policy. The policy provided UM coverage for bodily injury arising from the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle. Travelers moved for summary judgment, arguing that Lipsey’s injury did not arise from the use of an uninsured vehicle but from the intentional act of a third party using a firearm.
The trial court granted Travelers’ motion in part, ruling that punitive damages and attorney’s fees were unavailable. However, it denied the motion as to UM coverage, finding that Travelers failed to show no causal connection between Lipsey’s injury and the use of an uninsured vehicle. Travelers appealed.
Issue & Holding
Whether Lipsey’s injury arose out of the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle, thereby triggering UM coverage under the policy.
Holding: No. The injury was caused by a firearm, not the use of the vehicle, and there was no causal connection between the uninsured vehicle’s use and the gunfire. The trial court’s denial of summary judgment was reversed. But there was a dissenting opinion.
Reasoning
Majority Opinion Reasoning
The majority held that Lipsey’s injury did not arise out of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle, relying on Bennett v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 170 Ga. App. 829 (1984), which established that for an injury to be covered under a UM policy, there must be a causal connection between the use of a vehicle and the injury.
The court found that the assailants’ vehicle was merely the location from which the shots were fired, not the instrumentality that caused the injury. The vehicle did not contribute to the shooting in any way other than providing transportation for the shooters. The fact that the shooter was in the vehicle, or that the vehicle was used to flee the scene, did not establish a sufficient causal connection.
The majority contrasted this case with Abercrombie v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 602 (1995), where an uninsured vehicle was actively used to facilitate a targeted attack in which a driver positioned his vehicle to enable a passenger to fire multiple shots at a specific victim.
The majority concluded that Lipsey’s injury was not causally related to the use of the vehicle and that Travelers was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Dissenting Opinion Reasoning
Presiding Judge Barnes dissented, arguing that the case should be governed by Abercrombie. The dissent emphasized that Georgia courts apply a broad interpretation of the term “use” in UM policies and that an injury need not be proximately caused by a vehicle’s movement to be considered as arising from its use. The proper test is whether “a connection appears between the ‘use’ of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and resulting injury such as to render it more likely that the one grew out of the other.” Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 142 Ga. App. 562 (1977).
Barnes pointed out that the assailants in this case used their vehicle to enter the park and maneuver into position to fire the shots. Like Abercrombie, the vehicle was integral to the attack because it provided mobility and allowed the shooters to escape quickly. The dissent argued that the majority’s distinction between Abercrombie and this case was misplaced—just as the vehicle in Abercrombie was used to facilitate a moving attack, the assailants’ vehicle here enabled them to commit the shooting and immediately flee. The dissent concluded that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that Travelers was not required to provide UM coverage because Lipsey’s injury did not arise out of the use of an uninsured vehicle.
I think the majority clearly got it wrong here. Its reasoning is completely contrary to Abercrombie. The dissent is correct that Abercrombie’s reasoning and holding should control this case. The majority’s attempt to distinguish Abercrombie overlooks the fact that the vehicle in this case was used in a similar manner—to position the shooter for the attack and enable an escape. Just as in Abercrombie, the vehicle was an integral part of the crime, making the injury one that arose out of its use. The broad interpretation of ‘use’ in UM policies supports coverage in these circumstances.
Citation: Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company v. Lipsey, No. A24A1114 (Ga. Ct. App. November 1, 2024)
