Facts
John McKnight was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision on the morning of November 13, 2019, while traveling in stop-and-go traffic on Interstate 20 in DeKalb County. McKnight was driving a Chevrolet Silverado when Anthony Love, operating a Chevrolet Tahoe, struck him from behind. McKnight had braked and come to a stop due to traffic ahead. Moments before impact, McKnight looked in his rearview mirror and realized Love would be unable to stop in time.
McKnight could not see Love inside his vehicle but testified that Love appeared to be “coming pretty fast” despite stopped traffic and believed Love was distracted. Cell phone records showed that Love made and received calls during the approximately 20 minutes he had been driving that morning. Love testified that his vehicle was equipped with Bluetooth and that his phone was connected hands-free at the time of the collision. Whether he was using hands-free technology or not was disputed.
Love was cited for following too closely and later pled guilty to that offense. McKnight sustained injuries to his back and knee, requiring emergency care and subsequent medical treatment.
McKnight filed suit asserting negligence and negligence per se claims and seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, and expenses of litigation under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 on the theory that Love acted in bad faith. The bad faith theory was based on the contention that Love was not using hands-free technology, and therefore, he was in violation of Georgia’s hands-free law.
Love moved for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, arguing there was no evidence of bad faith. The trial court denied Love’s motion, finding a jury question on bad faith based primarily on Love’s alleged distraction and an issue of fact as to whether he violated Georgia’s hands-free law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Love’s guilty plea to following too closely, potential violations of other traffic laws, and alleged distracted driving.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether violations of traffic laws, standing alone, are sufficient to support a claim for litigation expenses based on bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
Issue & Holding
The issue in this case was: Does evidence that a driver violated traffic laws—including a guilty plea to following too closely—and may have been distracted while driving constitute “bad faith” sufficient to authorize an award of expenses of litigation under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11?
No. The Supreme Court held that violations of traffic laws, without more, do not establish bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Love’s guilty plea to following too closely, alleged distracted driving, and potential violations of other traffic statutes were insufficient to support an award of litigation expenses based on bad faith. The Court reversed.
Reasoning
Meaning of “Bad Faith” Under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11
The Court began by reviewing Georgia’s long-standing interpretation of “bad faith” under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 and its predecessors, which date back to the 1860 Code. Although the statute does not define “bad faith,” decades of precedent establish that it requires conduct more culpable than ordinary negligence.
Bad faith in this context generally involves intentional wrongdoing, wanton or reckless conduct, or behavior demonstrating a conscious indifference to known harmful consequences. The Court emphasized that mere negligence, poor judgment, or inadvertent conduct does not meet this standard.
Historically, awards of litigation expenses based on bad faith have been upheld where defendants engaged in fraud, intentional torts, misrepresentations, conscious disregard of known dangers, or similarly egregious conduct. Conversely, Georgia courts have consistently rejected attempts to equate simple negligence with bad faith.
Traffic Violations Do Not Automatically Establish Bad Faith
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that violating a public law enacted for another’s protection—such as traffic statutes—can alone establish bad faith. Traffic offenses are strict liability violations that do not require proof of intent or a culpable mental state. As such, they do not, by themselves, demonstrate the conscious wrongdoing or reckless disregard required for bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
The Court distinguished prior Court of Appeals decisions relied upon below, noting that those cases involved additional evidence of conscious decision-making or reckless conduct beyond mere statutory violations. No Georgia case had ever held that a traffic violation alone suffices to prove bad faith.
Application to Love’s Conduct
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McKnight, the record showed that Love was traveling below the speed limit in stop-and-go traffic, applied his brakes before impact, and may have been talking on his phone using hands-free technology. While this evidence could support ordinary negligence, it did not rise to the level of intentional misconduct, reckless disregard, or conscious wrongdoing.
The Court also rejected the notion that alleged cell phone distraction automatically creates a jury issue on bad faith. Adopting such a rule would effectively convert routine negligence cases into bad faith cases, contradicting O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11’s express directive that litigation expenses are generally not recoverable.
The Court emphasized that interpreting “bad faith” so broadly would erase the statute’s limiting language and improperly permit attorney’s fees in ordinary automobile collision cases.
Preserving the Statutory Distinction Between Negligence and Bad Faith
The Supreme Court stressed that O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is designed to allow recovery of litigation expenses only in exceptional circumstances—not as a routine add-on to negligence claims. Allowing traffic violations alone to support bad faith would collapse this distinction and undermine the statute’s structure.
Because McKnight presented no evidence that Love acted with intent to harm, reckless disregard, or conscious indifference, the bad faith claim should not have been submitted to a jury.
Conclusion
Love v. McKnight is a critical decision clarifying the limits of O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 in motor vehicle cases. It is clear now that the conduct must be intentional, wanton, reckless, or at least show a conscious indifference to the consequences.
It is important to point out that, while Love held that the violation of a traffic law, standing alone, could not support a bad faith finding under the statute, it did not state that the violation for a traffic law can never support such a finding. One can think of numerous violations where the driver’s behavior may meet this standard. For example, a driver traveling at a very high rate of speed (say, 100 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone), texting, or engaged in aggressive behavior.
Citation: Love v. McKnight, 321 Ga. 196, 913 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 2025)
